Importantly, these intra-individual correlations varied as a function of conspiracy mentality: The more people endorsed a conspiracy mentality, the stronger was their association of power with threat and the more they tended to see powerful groups as particularly less likeable [Imhoff, R. and Bruder, M. (2014) ‘Speaking (un-)truth to power: conspiracy mentality as a generalized political attitude’, European Journal of Personality, 28(1): 25-43].
[…]
Further evidence in support of the notion people endorsing a conspiracy worldview do not regard high power as a positive attribute comes from additional domains like epistemic trust in sources of knowledge or medical consumer decisions. Specifically, across a series of four studies, conspiracy mentality moderated the effect of source power on source credibility in the field of historical disputes [Imhoff, R., Lamberty, P. and Klein, O. (2018) ‘Using power as a negative cue: how conspiracy mentality affects epistemic trust in sources of historical knowledge’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(9): 1364-79]. It is interesting to note, however, that the source bias was more on the side of the people rejecting conspiracy theories than those endorsing them. Whereas people low on conspiracy mentality employed a heuristic of finding the identical position more credible when it came from a high power source, people high on conspiracy mentality showed virtually no bias. Although – compared to people low on conspiracy mentality – they saw powerful sources as less and powerless sources as more credible, they saw both sources as equal in that regard.
A similar pattern could be observed in the domain of medical choices [e.g. Lamberty, P. and Imhoff, R. (2018) ‘Powerful pharma and its marginalized alternatives: effect of individual differences in conspiracy mentality on attitudes towards medical approaches’, Social Psychology, 49(5): 255-70]. The belief in conspiracy theories attentuated preference for conventional over alternative medical approaches. People low in conspiracy mentality inferred medical effectiveness from the producing companies’ high power, but people high in conspiracy mentality saw them as equally effective. These results at least suggest that conspiracy mentality is less characterised by an absolute negative perception of those in power, but rather by the absence of a halo effect for those in power. This may seem rational to the extent that such a halo effect of power is objectively irrational. Particularly in the fields of knowledge generation and medical treatments, however, it may seem functional, if not necessary to trust established institutions rather than judging no difference between the New York Times and a blog on medical science and alternative treatments.
– ‘Conspiracy beliefs as psycho-political reactions to perceived power’, in Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories (2020), pp. 196-7
There is, however, a perspective that may be seen as more functional and more in line the general principle of homeostasis both for the individual and in its social effects. For the individual, seen through the muddy waters of a conspiracy might actually increase feelings of agency and power. After all, not falling for the red herring to distraxct from the real conspiracy lays the very ground to expose and eventually stop it. To the extent that conspiracy beliefs fuel feelings of outrage and a resulting propensity to alter what is perceived as unjust, they might motivate rahter than undermine political action. Indeed, conspiracy mentality has been connected to a greater willingness to engage in political action [Imhoff, R. and Bruder, M. (2014) ‘Speaking (un-)truth to power: conspiracy mentality as a generalized political attitude’, European Journal of Personality, 28(1): 25-43; Imhoff, R. and Lamberty, P. (2018) ‘How paranoid are conspiracy believers? Towards a more fine-grained understanding of the connect and disconnect between paranoia and belief in conspiracy theories’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 48: 909-26], and non-normative forms of protest in particular.
– Ibid., p. 199
As discussed above, conspiracy beliefs are associated with a variety of outcomes that can legitimately be called non-normative: From support of terrorist or extremist groups […], illegal and violent forms of protests, to intentions to engage in everyday crime […]. If most aspects of our society are illegitimately influenced by a few powerful people, and the official rules and norms are just a means to uphold this scandalous situation, not complying with laws, rules and norms is not only legitimate but an almost necessary step toward autonomy and liberation. Conspiracy believers are thus, it seems, powerless, but more likely to be disobedient to social norms and inhibited by what others (the sleeping masses) think of their demeanour. This conception aligns very well with the association of feelings of powerlessness with non-normative protests and political violence, potentially following from the perception of having ‘nothing to lose’ […].
This characterisation, however, creates some tension to a recurring theme in the social psychological literature on social power: here, having power reduces inhibitions and compliance with perceived norms, and liberates people to act on their impulses. Power reduces the impact of situational pressures […] and general awareness of constraints […]. This state of disinhibition has both positive (e.g. overcoming inertia to help others […]) and negative (e.g. unethical behaviour […]) outcomes […]. Both powerful men and women are more likely to engage in extramarital sex than their powerless counterparts (Lammers, Maner 2016). Men and women who reported to hold more power in the workplace not only admitted having greater interest in non-normative varieties of sexual behaviour (sexual masochism, sexual sadism), but did so disproportionately for the variant that was less frequent (and thus descriptively non-normative) for their gender role (men for masochism, women for sadism; [Lammers, J. and Imhoff, R. (2016) ‘Power and sado-masochism: understanding the antecedents of a knotty relationship’, Social Psychology and Personality Science, 7(2): 142-8]). Thus, a plethora of research is in line with the idea that power (not powerlessness) evokes a reduced reliance on social norms (and, by implication, powerlessness increases it).
Taking these two lines of thought together leaves a conundrum. […] To our best knowledge, there is currently no authoritative solution to reconcile the psychological literature on a (comparatively) inhibiting and norm-compliant effect of low power, with the collective action literature making the opposite predictions of greater non-normative action in situations of powerlessness. One way to make sense of these findings might be to think about a curvilinear relation between power and norm compliance. Norm compliance could then be maximal for average levels of power and a deviation in either direction would reduce it. High levels of power would reduce norm compliance due to its general disinhibiting effect and because high power implies that one does not have to take others’ reactions into one’s consideration. Low levels of power would relate to reduced norm compliance because at some point one has ‘nothing-to-lose’ abd therefore no reason to care about others’ reactions.
– Ibid., pp. 201-2