One important insight in the field of social cognition is that most beliefs that people hold about the world originate from System 1 [intuitive, emotional, and heuristic] thinking. For instance, Gilbert, Tafarodi and Malone (1993) noted that people’s first intuitive impulse after comprehending a proposition is to believe it, and they need to exert active mental effort (System 2 [analytic and deliberately rational]) to unbelieve a proposition.
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We will argue that, like other forms of belief […] conspiracy beliefs are primarily rooted in System 1 thinking. We will also argue that, after forming initial conspiracy suspicions, however, people subsequently use System 2 processes to justify and rationalise these suspicious sentiments. Through motivated reasoning, perceivers develop extensive and articulate conspiracy theories based on valid arguments, wild speculations or a combination of these. Most conspiracy theories hence originate from System 1 thinking, but people justify and maintain them through System 2 thinking.
– ‘Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories’, in Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories (2020), pp. 168-9
In sum, the first indicator of System 1 thinking, intuitive thinking, predicts belief in conspiracy theories. Conspiracy beliefs are related with intuitive belief systems (e.g. belief in the paranormal), heuristic thinking and the automatic cognitive processes of pattern perception and agency detection. Analytic thinking instead predicts decreased belief in conspiracy theories. These findings support the assertion that conspiracy theories originate from System 1 thinking.
– Ibid., p. 172
Lacking control is an experience closely associated with anxious uncertainty and, indeed, participants who recalled a situation where they lacked control subsequently reported stronger conspiracy beliefs than participants who recalled a situation where they had control […]. Likewise, subjective uncertainty […] and threats to the societal status quo […] increase conspiracy thinking. Finally, attitudinal ambivalence – an unpleasant experience closely associated with feelings of anxious uncertainty, characterised by mixed (i.e. both positive and negative) evaluations of an attitude-object – increases belief in conspiracy theories […]. These findings suggest that feelings and emotions associated with threatening experiences causally influence belief in conspiracy theories.
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These findings suggest that both positive and negative emotions may drive conspiracy beliefs, but only if they imply feelings of uncertainty about the world.
– Ibid., pp. 172-3
What do the cognitive processes described in this chapter imply for legitimate suspicions of corruption? Would a police detective, who ends up uncovering a major conspiracy committing corporate fraud, also use System 1 and 2 processes in a similar fashion? We speculate here that quite often such a detective indeed might go through a similar mental sequence. Many corruption investigations start with an inconclusive piece of evidence that prompts an intuitive suspicion that ‘something is fishy’ (System 1), which subsequently warrants a more extensive investigation (System 2). This investigation, then, includes assessing eyewitness testimonies, collecting objective evidence such as payment transactions and consulting legal experts to establish if, and in what specific way, the suspected conspirators broke the law.
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A second and related concern is what the propositions of the present chapter imply for citizens who disbelieve most conspiracy theories. We speculate that the cognitive processes underlying such disbelief can take two distinct forms. One form is that people may disbelieve conspiracy theories through similar cognitive processes. In these cases, people intuitively believe in the nonexistence of a conspiracy, and then justify this intuition through motivated reasoning. This process may lead perceivers to ignore actual malpractice (e.g. Republicans who, as the Watergate scandal unfolded, firmly believed in Nixon’s innocence until he resigned). Both belief and disbelief in conspiracy theories can be rooted in the cognitive processes described here.
A different form of disbelief, however, is the result of habitually processing information objectively and critically. We propose that the tendency to rely on impartial analytic thinking and value objective evidence is at the core of scepticism […]. Of importance, scepticism does not imply gullibly accepting any official statement of power holders, nor does it imply gullibly accepting any bizarre conspiracy theory. Instead, it implies a humble awareness that one’s initial intuitions may be mistaken, along with a reliance on evidence, reason and logic to come to objective conclusions. The sceptic approach thus involves a critical analysis of policy proposals or official readings of distressing events, but, also, a critical analysis of conspiracy theories. Sceptics also may form initial impressions of societal events through System 1 processes, but, in contrast to non-sceptics, they subsequently are more likely to unbelieve these first impressions through System 2 processes untainted by motivated reasoning.
– Ibid., pp. 176-7