There are thus two angles from which one may argue that it can be analytically helpful to look at conspiracy beliefs as a particular form of religion or ‘esotericism’: The social and the epistemic. They are partially intertwined in Kocku von Stuckrad’s definition of esoteric discourse as a ‘rhetoric of hidden truth, which can be unveiled in a specific way and established contrary to other interpretations of the universe and history – often that of the institutionalised majority’ [Von Stuckrad, K. (2005) Western Esotericism, London: Equinox, p. 10]. Their epistemic status as counterknowledge is important here, but so are the particular ways these hidden truths are uncovered; they may follow common esoteric knowledge strategies (see Asprem, Dyrendal 2019). Furthermore, there can be an initiatory element to both belief and participation. Acceptance of this higher counterknowledge separates those on the inside from an unknowing outside, and the degree to which one is accepted as initiated in the knowledge can be ‘organised’ in levels. There are thus parallels between the sociology of conspiracy culture and esoteric societies. For both, the secret knowledge holds salvific potential, although in the case of conspiracy beliefs mostly on a collective and political level [see Dyrendal, A. (2013) ‘Hidden knowledge, hidden powers: esotericism and conspiracy culture’, in E. Asprem and K. Granholm (eds.) Contemporary Esotericism, Sheffield: Equinox. pp. 200-25].
– ‘Conspiracy theory and religion’, in Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories (2020), p. 373